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Online Pricing via Stackelberg and Incentive Games in a Micro-Grid
Fernando Genis Mendoza*, Dario Bauso and George Konstantopoulos
Abstract— This paper deals with the analysis and design of
online pricing mechanisms in micro-grids. Two cases are studied
in which the market layer is modeled as an open-loop and
closed-loop dynamical system respectively. In the case of open-
loop market dynamics, the price is generated as equilibrium
price of a Stackelberg game with an incentive strategy. In
such Stackelberg game, the leader is the energy supplier, the
follower is the consumer, and the leader plays an incentive
strategy. In the case of closed-loop market dynamics, the price
is obtained as a function of the power supplied and the demand.
A stability analysis is provided for both cases, which sheds
light on the transient and steady-state behavior of the system
in terms of the grids time constant, inertial, damping and
synchronizing coefficients. Conditions on the parameters that
guarantee asymptotic stability are obtained for both open-loop
and closed-loop configurations. The findings provide an insight
on the impact of the time constant and damping coefficient on
the demand and power. The study also elucidates the ways in
which the suppliers decisions influence the output values, thus
contributing to clarify the interconnection between the market
and physical layers in a micro-grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pricing mechanisms on electrical power systems constitute
a viable way to shift the demand peaks and thus to improve
efficiency. The underlying assumption is that the consumer
and the supplier are rational and try to maximize their profits.
Under such an assumption, a change of the price on the part
of the independent system operator modifies the consumer’s
behavior and the analysis of the resulting dynamics is a core
element in the literature on online pricing. Online pricing
requires the implementation of such incentive mechanisms
in real-time to increase the profits of the supplier by charg-
ing more when the production costs are higher instead of
applying a flat rate. Similarly, incentives can be used to
let the consumer know when is more convenient to carry
out the more power-consuming tasks. Effective methods to
determine the electricity price dynamically present several
challenging open problems including: Global optimality for
both consumers and supplier, the uncertainties in the con-
sumers’ behaviors and preferences, and more importantly,
the safe operation of the electrical systems when subjected
to such mechanisms.
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A. Problem Statement
This paper focuses on bringing together the market and
physical dynamics that are involved in determining the
functioning of the micro-grid as a whole. Two configurations
are studied in which the market layer is modeled as an
open-loop and closed-loop dynamical system respectively.
In the first configuration, a Stackelberg game is introduced
between the supplier and consumer where the supplier plays
an incentive strategy to generate an equilibrium price. In
the second, the price is obtained as feedback function of
the power supplied, the demand and an incentive strategy.
However, a detailed stability analysis should be conducted
on both configurations to ensure their correct operation.
B. Main Contributions
As a first result, conditions for stability are obtained and
the transient response of a micro-grid system subject to a
price which is generated exogenously from a Stackelberg
game is studied. The Stackelberg game introduces an in-
centive problem, which in turn determines the steady-state
gain of the open-loop market dynamics. As a second result,
a general feedback rule to obtain the price as a function
of the power flow and demand is derived. Such a rule is
based on an ex-ante price formulation. Stability analysis is
performed and the impact of the parameters on the transient
dynamics of the micro-grid system is studied. In addition to
this, simulations were carried out using both open-loop and
closed-loop pricing mechanisms based on data from [1].
C. Reviewed Literature
The present work is in the same spirit as [2], where a
stability analysis of micro-grids together with the study of
the effects of damping and inertia for homogeneous micro-
grids was conducted. The present paper differs from [2] as
we add the market layer to the physical layer of the micro-
grid. The approximation we used for the demand response
as a first-order system is introduced in [3]; examples of this
for households and businesses can be found in [4], [5] and
[6]. Transient analysis on coupled oscillators and the relation
between damping and inertial coefficients is investigated
in [7] and [1]. In this paper we use the swing dynamics
to model the transient stability in analogy with the model
developed in [7], [8] and [1]. The formulation used in the
current study for the ex-ante price, including the supplier and
consumer models was first proposed in [9]. We refer to the
cost for electricity generation mentioned in [10]. Although
the use of incentives on micro-grids have been previously
studied in [8], here they are implemented as a reward to the
consumer when participating in an online pricing scheme.
The concepts for Stackelberg game and the incentive strategy
formulation used in the present work are introduced in [11]
and [12], respectively. In [13] the Stackelberg approach is
used in conjunction with evolutionary algorithms for online
pricing schemes. The existence of equilibrium points using
other kinds of games including the Stackelberg game is
demonstrated in [14] and [15]. The main difference of our
current study to the papers above is our novel inclusion of
the incentive strategy when obtaining the price.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
introduce the micro-grid and demand response models, and
formulate the Stackelberg game. In Section III, we present
the main results. In Section IV, we provide simulations.
Finally in Section V, we provide conclusions and discuss
future directions.
II. MICRO-GRID AND ONLINE PRICING MODELS
In this section we introduce the dynamic models for the
micro-grid and for the online pricing mechanism in a unified
framework.
A. Micro-Grid Model
A micro-grid connected to the main grid can be modeled
combining an integrator dynamics and a swing dynamics.
The first equation is associated with the rate of change of
the power flow into the grid as function of the deviation
between the nominal mains frequency and the frequency of
the grid [7]. This is given by
˙Pflow = T (fnom − f), (1)
where f is the operating frequency of the micro-grid, fnom
is the nominal frequency, which is considered to be the
frequency of the main grid and T is the synchronizing co-
efficient which is obtained as the power transferred over the
transmission line between the micro-grid and the mains [16].
The second dynamics describes the rate of change of fre-
quency as function of the current frequency f , the power
flow Pflow, the generated power from the mains Pnom,
the nominal consumed power by the loads Prated and the
shiftable demand response ∆Pd [8]. This second dynamics
is given by
ḟ = −D
M
f +
1
M
(Pflow + Pnom − Prated −∆Pd), (2)
where D denotes the damping coefficient of the micro-
grid and M is its inertial coefficient, the dynamics for
∆Pd are explained in the following subsection. The block
representation of the market layer and the physical layer
of a single micro-grid is shown in Fig. 1. There, the input
exogenous to the grid represents the price Λ obtained from
the online open-loop mechanism.
B. Demand Response
For a given price, the demand response dynamics can be
represented as a first-order system [3]
˙∆Pd = −
1
τ
∆Pd +
k
τ
Λ, (3)
fnom +
−
e
T
s
1
Ms+D
fPflow
Prated
Pnom
−
∆Pd
+
+ −
k
τs+1
Λ
Market Layer
Physical Layer
Fig. 1. Block system of a micro-grid with demand response ∆Pd, power
Pflow and frequency f subject to exogenous price input Λ.
where ∆Pd is the demand, τ the time constant of the market
dynamics and Λ is the price multiplied by a DC gain k.
The demand is subtracted from the power available in the
grid as shown in Fig. 1 and represents the quantity of
electrical energy that is used by the consumer given the price
announced by the supplier. The price Λ is generated from a
Stackelberg game as described in the following section.
C. Consumer and Supplier Functions
Both the supplier and the consumers are considered to
be price-taking, profit-maximizing agents. In particular the
supplier wants to maximize the price and the consumers want
to consume as much as possible with the minimum prize. The
power supplied Ps and power consumed Pc are selected as
the quantity that maximizes their respective profit functions
[9]:
Ps = argmax
x
max
Λ∈[
¯
Λ,Λ̄]
Λx− c(x), (4)
Pc = argmax
x
min
Λ∈[
¯
Λ,Λ̄]
v(x)− Λx, (5)
where the value function of all the consumers in the grid
are denoted by v(x), which represents the value that the
consumer obtains by consuming x units of electricity. Anal-
ogously, the supplier has a production cost function c(x).
We assume that the value and cost functions are concave and
convex, respectively [8], [9]. In the maximization problems
defined above, we denote by Λ̄ and
¯
Λ the upper and lower
bounds for the price. In other words, we assume that the price
lies in the interval Λ ∈ [
¯
Λ, Λ̄]. The corresponding supply
and consumption values obtained from (4) and (5) under the
minimum and maximum prices are denoted by
¯
xs and x̄s
and
¯
xc and x̄c, respectively. This implies that the supply
and consumption values lie in the intervals xs ∈ [
¯
xs, x̄s]
and xc ∈ [
¯
xc, x̄c]. The optimal supply and consumption
values x̄∗s and x̄
∗
c can be obtained by taking the derivative
of the objective functions in (4)-(5) and equaling to zero.
This corresponds to identifying as optimal those points in
which the derivative (slope of the curve) is parallel to the
price line, as illustrated in Fig. 2. From the figure we note
that x̄c corresponds to the maximum consumption given the
x
f(x)
Λ̄x
Λx
c(x)
x
f(x)
Λ̄x
Λx
v(x)
x̄∗s
xs
xc x̄∗c
Fig. 2. Supplier and consumer functions and quantities.
lowest price
¯
Λ, similar conclusions can be drawn for all other
bounds.
In order to steer the solutions to an equilibrium, a Stack-
elberg game is proposed. The advantage of formulating such
a new game is that the incentive strategy arising from such
a game no longer depends directly on the cost and value
functions, but solely on the Stackelberg equilibrium. Let
us define reference points to be employed in the game.
Normalizing the optimal solutions to each problem to unitary
values, such solutions can be taken equal to
(
¯
Λ, x̄c) = (0, 1), (6)
(Λ̄, x̄s) = (1, 1), (7)
for the consumer and for the supplier respectively. The
incentive strategy is illustrated in Section III.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, the main result of the paper is presented.
First for the open-loop configuration we formulate the Stack-
elberg game, the incentive problem and determine its optimal
solution. Secondly we perform the stability analysis and
obtain the steady-state gains of the micro-grid model subject
to the game-generated price. Thirdly, we show a way to
express the price as a function of power and demand and
perform both stability and final value analysis on the closed-
loop micro-grid model.
A. Normalized Stackelberg Game Formulation
Assuming that the demand response ∆Pd of the consumers
depends on the price Λ set by the supplier, the following
Stackelberg game with incentive strategy is proposed. The
game provides an incentive strategy and an associated on-
line pricing mechanism for the case of open-loop market
dynamics. First, denoting the supplier as the “Leader” and
the consumers as the “Follower”, we introduce πL(qL, qF )
and πF (qL, qF ) as their respective profit functions. Both
functions depend on the outputs qL of the leader and qF
of the follower. The output of the supplier is the price Λ that
will minimize its cost and maximize its profits. The incentive
problem is formulated in a way such that the leader selects
a price as function of the follower’s demand. The following
profit functions capture the tension between the supplier and
the consumer. Namely the consumer prefers a low price and
to consume large quantities of energy, whereas the supplier
aims to balancing supply and demand. Let (6) and (7) be the
optimal solutions of the optimization problems (4) and (5)
respectively. Then the profit function for the leader is given
by
πL = qLqF −
1
2
q2F . (8)
Similarly, the profit function for the follower is given by
πF = log qF + 1− qLqF . (9)
We refer to incentive strategy as the choice that the leader
takes depending on the one of the follower. Namely a
function Γ(qF ). For the sake of tractability we propose the
following assumption, however, whitout loss of generality,
other class of strategies can be employed in a similar way.
Assumption 1: Strategy Γ(qF ) is linear and given by
qL = γqF . (10)
Theorem 1: Let Assumption 1 hold true. The Stackelberg
game yields the following equilibrium point:
q∗F = γ
−
1
2 , (11)
q∗L = γ
1
2 . (12)
Proof: Let the leader maximize (8), and the follower
maximize (9). Because of the concavity of (14), the maxi-
mum of the follower is obtained by taking the derivative of
its profit function and equaling it to zero:
∂πF
∂qF
=
1
qF
− qL = 0. (13)
Under the assumption that the leader is playing according to
(10), then (13) can then be rewritten as
1
qF
− γqF = 0. (14)
The above yields the optimal solution q∗F as in (11). Once
the follower has chosen its demand, the leader then obtains
the price substituting (11) in (10), which leads to (12).
The optimal solutions q∗F and q
∗
L determine the equilibrium
of the game. Now the leader has to design a proper strategy γ
to obtain the best equilibrium point. For the supplier the best
equilibrium point is the one closest to the optimum (1, 1)
as in (7). Figure 3 illustrates the way in which a different
choice for strategy γ produces different quantities of price
and demand at the equilibrium. From the figure it is evident
that the output of the leader (the supplier) depends on the
quantity selected by the follower (consumer). In particular,
the higher the price, the lower the consumption.
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Fig. 3. Stackelberg equilibrium points as a function of γ.
Remark: From the demand response dynamics in (3), the
following expression can be obtained at steady-state:
Λss =
1
k
∆P ssd . (15)
Above there is a linear relation between the price and the
demand, it can be implied that the incentive γ can be treated
as a gain, making the choice of the Stackelberg game with
a linear Γ(qF ) appropriate for the studied case.
B. Stability of Open Loop Configuration
Now that we have explained the ways in which the price Λ
is obtained, let us analyze the stability of the system subject
to such input. From the system configuration illustrated
in Fig. 1 and equations (1)-(3) the following state space
representation is derived:


Ṗflow
ḟ
˙∆Pd

 =
A
︷ ︸︸ ︷


0 −T 0
1
M
− D
M
− 1
M
0 0 − 1
τ




Pflow
f
∆Pd


+
B
︷ ︸︸ ︷


0 T 0
0 0 1
M
k
τ
0 0




Λ
fnom
Pnom − Prated

 . (16)
Theorem 2: System (16) is stable for all positive values
of parameters T , M , D, and τ .
Proof: Consider matrix A in (16). The characteristic
polynomial of the entire system can be obtained from the
denominator of the system’s transfer function, which is
expressed by the determinant of sI −A:
|sI −A| =
∣
∣
∣
∣


s T 0
− 1
M
s+ D
M
1
M
0 0 s+ 1
τ


∣
∣
∣
∣
= s3 + (
D
M
+
1
τ
)s2 + (
T
M
+
D
τM
)s+
T
τM
. (17)
The roots of the above polynomial, namely the eigenvalues
of system (16) are given as follows:
s1 = −
1
τ
,
s2,3 =
−D ±
√
D2 − 4MT
2M
.
(18)
From Nyquist stability criterion, for the system to be asymp-
totically stable the real part of its eigenvalues must be
negative, namely the eigenvalues must lie in the left-hand
side of the complex plane. From (18) the system is stable if
the following conditions on the parameters are met:
τ > 0 and MT > 0. (19)
The above conditions are always true given that the param-
eters are strictly positive.
Remark: The transient of the system is characterized by
oscillations, when the eigenvalues have complex part, namely
for D2 < 4MT . On the contrary, no oscillations arise when
the eigenvalues are real and specifically for D2 > 4MT .
Theorem 3: The steady-state-gain from a step input of
magnitude Λm, fm or Pm=Pnom−Prated correspondingly,
to system (16) is expressed by:
P ssflow = kΛm +Dfm − Pm, (20)
fss = fm, (21)
∆P ssd = kΛm. (22)
Proof: From system (16) a transfer function matrix
can be obtained as Y (s)/U(s) = C(sI − A)−1B. Since
the feedback in the mentioned system is unitary, matrix
C is considered to be an identity matrix I of appropriate
dimensions. Substituting matrices A and B we obtain


Pflow(s)
f(s)
∆Pd(s)

=


G11(s) G12(s) G13(s)
G12(s) G22(s) G23(s)
G31(s) 0 0




Λ(s)
fnom(s)
Pnom(s)−Prated(s)

,
(23)
where
G11(s)=
P (s)
Λ(s)
=
kT
M( D
M
s+ s2 + T
M
)(τs+ 1)
,
G12(s) =
P (s)
fnom(s)
=
T ( D
M
+ s)
D
M
s+ s2 + T
M
,
G13(s) =
P (s)
Pnom(s)− Prated(s)
= − T
M( D
M
s+ s2 + T
M
)
,
G21(s) =
f(s)
Λ(s)
= − ks
M( D
M
s+ s2 + T
M
)(τs+ 1)
,
G22(s) =
f(s)
fnom(s)
=
T
M
D
M
s+ s2 + T
M
,
G23(s) =
f(s)
Pnom(s)−Prated(s)
=
s
M( D
M
s+ s2 + T
M
)
,
G31(s) =
r(s)
Λ(s)
=
k
τs+ 1
.
From the final value theorem, we have that the steady-state
gain for a system described by a transfer function F (s) and
subjected to an input U(s) can be obtained as
lim
s→0
sG(s)U(s). (24)
From (24) and (23) and assuming a step input of magnitude
Λm, fm or Pm we obtain:
lim
s→0
sG11(s)
Λm
s
+ sG12(s)
fm
s
+ sG13(s)
Pm
s
=
kT
M T
M
Λm +
T D
M
T
M
fm −
T
M T
M
Pm,
lim
s→0
sG21(s)
Λm
s
+ sG22(s)
fm
s
+ sG23(s)
Pm
s
= − 0
M T
M
Λm +
T
M
T
M
fm +
0
M T
M
Pm,
lim
s→0
sG31(s)
Λm
s
= kΛm.
Hence, the steady-state values (20)-(22) are obtained.
In view of the considerations in subsection III-A, the price
Λ is the supplier’s output from the Stackelberg game and is
a function of a selected strategy Γ(qF ) that characterizes the
equilibrium point in terms of supply and demand as shown
in (11). This implies that for every possible equilibrium point
we obtain a different steady-state value.
C. Price as a Function of Power and Demand
To determine a way to express the price Λ as a linear
function of power and demand while closing the loop of the
system in Fig. 1, a few concepts must be introduced in the
same spirit as in [9].
An ex-ante price Λ(t) can be calculated from an estimated
supply ŝ which is in turn obtained from the total of a previous
demand, namely
ŝ(t) = Prated(t) + ∆Pd(t) (25)
which essentially represents the balancing of supply and
demand. From it and by solving the supplier’s cost function
in (4) we obtain
Λ(t) =
d
dx
c(x)
∣
∣
∣
ŝ(t)
. (26)
A physical interpretation of the above is that the supplier
supplies a quantity equal to the demand from a previous
period of time. The price is then the one that is optimal
for the given supplied quantity. Graphically, the price is
identified by the slope of the curve representing the cost
evaluated in the point corresponding to the supplied quantity.
As mentioned in [10], the supplier cost function is the
following:
Assumption 2: The supplier has a cost function c(x) of
the form:
c(x) = α
x2
2
, (27)
where x is the quantity of supplied power and α is a scalar
value. Such cost function has been experimentally validated
fnom +
−
e
T
s
1
Ms+D
fPflow
Prated
Pnom
−
∆Pd
+
+ −
γ
τs+1−γ
Market Layer
Physical Layer
Fig. 4. Block system of the micro-grid with closed-loop online pricing.
for thermal generators in [17] and is generally accepted as a
sound approximation as seen in [18], [19] and [20].
Substituting the supply (25) and the cost (27) into (26)
yields the following expression for the ex-ante price:
Λ(t) =
d
dx
α
x2
2
∣
∣
∣
ŝ(t)
= αx
∣
∣
∣
ŝ(t)
. (28)
We are ready to establish the following result.
Lemma 1: Let Assumption 2 hold, the price is given by
Λ(t) = α(Prated(t) + ∆Pd(t)). (29)
Now that we have obtained the dependence of price Λ on the
sum of the nominal consumed power Prated and the demand
shift ∆Pd, the block system describing the market dynamics
can be rearranged closing the loop as in Fig. 4. The system’s
dynamics in the case of closed-loop market dynamics can
then be written as
˙Pflow = T (fnom − f), (30)
ḟ = −D
M
f +
1
M
(Pflow + Pnom − Prated −∆Pd), (31)
˙∆Pd = −
1
τ
∆Pd +
kα
τ
(Prated +∆Pd). (32)
We can freely substitute kα with the incentive γ since both
are linear relationships to the consumed power and both
serve as means of shifting the total demand via ∆Pd. The
state space representation of the closed-loop system can be
rewritten in matrix form as follows


Ṗflow
ḟ
˙∆Pd

=
A
︷ ︸︸ ︷


0 −T 0
1
M
− D
M
− 1
M
0 0 1
τ
(γ−1)




Pflow
f
∆Pd

+
B
︷ ︸︸ ︷


0 T 0
1
M
0 − 1
M
0 0 γ
τ




Pnom
fnom
Prated

,
(33)
as in Section III-B, the characteristic polynomial can be
obtained from |sI −A|, yielding
|sI−A|=s3+(D
M
+
1−γ
τ
)s2+(
T
M
−D(γ−1)
τM
)s−T (γ−1)
τM
.
(34)
We are now ready to enunciate the following result.
Theorem 4: System (33) is stable for all non-negative
values of parameters T , M , D and τ . Additionally, the
incentive strategy γ must comply with the condition:
0 > γ > 1. (35)
Proof: The role of the parameter conditions for stability
are obtained similarly as demonstrated in Theorem 2, the
roots of the characteristic polynomial (34) are the following:
s1 =
γ − 1
τ
,
s2,3 =
−D ±
√
D2 − 4MT
2M
.
(36)
which yields the condition MT > 0 that is always true. To
find the conditions for γ, the Routh-Hurwitz criteria can be
applied to (34), the following conditions are obtained:
D
M
+
1−γ
τ
> 0,
T
M
− D(γ−1)
τM
> 0,
(
D
M
+
1−γ
τ
)(
T
M
− D(γ−1)
τM
) > −T (γ−1)
τM
.
(37)
Such conditions together with (36) can be reduced to obtain
the range of values (35) for the incentive strategy.
The meaning behind (35) is that if the gain is too small this
results in a price reduction that will increase the demand, and
by trying to maximise their utility function, the consumers
will demand power beyond the capabilities of the micro-grid.
Therefore, we can conclude that the closed-loop system is
stable for certain bounds of γ, as we will illustrate in section
IV-B. Hence the supplier must be aware of the consumption
historical patterns in the grid and select an appropriate value
for the incentive.
Remark: Taking into account the previous statement and
the expression of the eigenvalues in (36) we can also derive
the two following considerations:
• The system is stable with complex eigenvalues when
(38) is met, namely when
D2 < 4MT. (38)
• The system is stable with real, distinct and negative
eigenvalues when the following inequality holds
D2 > 4MT. (39)
As can be seen from the mentioned inequalities, the oscilla-
tions in the system’s response depend mainly on the value
of the damping and inertial parameters D and M , which
still holds with he findings in [7] despite our new system
configuration. Additionally, we can provide the following
observations obtained empirically regarding the role of the
system’s parameters on the transient of the system. The value
of the time constant τ affects directly the settling time of
Pflow and ∆Pd. The synchronizing coefficient T influences
the speed of the oscillations of all states proportionally, and
reduces the settling time as well; T also alters the peak
values of Pflow and ∆Pd. The inertial coefficient M affects
oscillation speed on all states and the peak responses of
Pflow and ∆Pd without affecting their steady-state values.
The damping coefficient D directly increases the settling
time for larger values while also modifying the steady-state
values of Pflow and f . The gain γ directly changes the
magnitude of Pflow and ∆Pd, increasing the settling time for
larger values. The last two observations can be corroborated
by the following result.
Theorem 5: The steady-state gain from a corresponding
step input of magnitude Pnm, fm or Prm to system (33) is
expressed by:
P ssflow =
1
1− γ Prm − Pnm +Dfm, (40)
fss =fm, (41)
∆P ssd =
γ
1− γ Prm. (42)
Proof: From system (33) a transfer function matrix can
be obtained. Since the feedback in the mentioned system is
unitary, matrix C is considered to be an identity matrix I of
appropriate dimensions. Substituting matrices A and B into
Y (s)/U(s) = C(sI −A)−1B we obtain


Pflow(s)
f(s)
∆Pd(s)

=


G11(s) G12(s) G13(s)
G21(s) G22(s) G23(s)
0 0 G33(s)




Pnom(s)
fnom(s)
Prated(s)

 (43)
where
G11(s) =
Pflow(s)
Pnom(s)
= − T
s(D +Ms) + T
,
G12(s) =
Pflow(s)
fnom(s)
=
T (D +Ms)
s(D +Ms) + T
,
G13(s) =
Pflow(s)
Prated(s)
=
sTτ + T
(−γ + sτ + 1)(s(D +Ms) + T ) ,
G21(s) =
f(s)
Pnom(s)
=
s
s(D +Ms) + T
,
G22(s) =
f(s)
fnom(s)
=
T
s(D +Ms) + T
,
G23(s) = −
f(s)
Prated(s)
=
τs2 + s
(−γ + sτ + 1)(s(D +Ms) + T ) ,
G33(s) =
∆Pd(s)
Prated(s)
=
γ
τs+ 1− γ .
Applying the final value theorem from (24) to (43) and
assuming a corresponding step input of magnitude Pnm, fm
or Prm we obtain:
lim
s→0
sG11(s)
Pnm
s
+ sG12(s)
fm
s
+ sG13(s)
Prm
s
= −T
T
Pnm +
TD
T
fm +
T
(1− γ)T Prm,
lim
s→0
sG21(s)
Pnm
s
+ sG22(s)
fm
s
+ sG23(s)
Prm
s
= − 0
T
Pnm +
T
T
fm +
0
(1− γ)T Prm,
lim
s→0
sG31(s)
Prm
s
=
γ
1− γ Prm.
Hence, the steady-state values (40)-(42) are obtained.
IV. SIMULATIONS
Micro-grid parameters were selected based on typical
values of a grid with capacity of 60 MVA that is providing 30
MVA of power to the main grid: T = 30 MVA, M = 0.2 MJ-
s/rad and D = 1 MJ/rad in accordance to [1]; the simulation
time is 60 seconds, initial state values are selected randomly
and the grid is subject to step inputs of fnom = 50 Hz,
Pnom = 50, Prated = 20 MVA. The time constant for
the demand response has been selected as τ = 3 s, two
justifications are behind this, the first is to show the results
more clearly, the second is that in the future, customers might
be able to access real time prices in a more immediate way,
facilitating the implementation of automated decision making
given a price.
A. Grid with Exogenous Price Input
In addition to the parameters previously mentioned, the
gain is selected as k = 25 and the price Λ is a value in the
range of [0, 1], in the simulation, only three different values
of Λ are selected for illustrative, tractability purposes, and
to show the system’s response to abrupt changes. Figure 5
shows the open-loop configuration response. Note that the
demand ∆Pd reacts in accordance with the consumer be-
havior discussed in section II-B. Oscillations arise during the
transient of the system, also the sum of powers in the grid
Pnom − Prated −∆Pd does not turn negative, meaning that
the increase/decrease of demand does not surpass the power
available in the grid. Finally, none of the states exceeds the
60 MVA capacity of the micro-grid, it can be seen that the
power flow reacts according to the demand shift. Figure 6
shows the response under the same parameter values with
the exception of D = 2 MJ/rad, which is sufficiently large
to damp the oscillations. Note that when the power flow
increases, a larger damping can be chosen but this will in
might produce power flow values out of the 60 MVA capacity
of the grid.
Selecting large values of k can also result in power flow
values larger than the capacity of the grid, Fig. 7 shows the
response of the grid under the same parameter values as for
the first example except for k = 250. Note that the frequency
state deviates largely from the desired 50 Hz. These results
show that the response can be asymptotically stable but the
parameters must be selected in a way that the demand does
not exceed the power available.
B. Grid with Closed Loop Market Dynamics
The following set of simulations adopts the same param-
eters and frequency inputs as in the previous example. In
Fig. 8 with γ = 0.5 and D = 1 MJ/rad, it can be seen that
the power flow can take negative values due to oscillations
during the transient. However the frequency f has a the same
steady-state value. Also the demand shifted because of the
incentive γ is not larger than the power available. In Fig. 9
the damping is increased to D = 2 MJ/rad to eliminate
oscillations and as in the open-loop configuration, there is
an increase in the power flow state that can ultimately lead
to values exceeding the capacity of the grid. As implied in
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Fig. 5. Time plot of (top) price, (middle) power flow, and (bottom)
frequency; oscillations may arise in the frequency and power flow plot.
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Fig. 6. Time plot of (top) price, (middle) power flow, and (bottom)
frequency; by increasing the damping coefficient oscillations are reduced.
the stability analysis, there exists a sufficiently large value
of γ which compromises the stability of the system. This
is illustrated in Fig. 10 where γ = 0.8 and the power
available becomes negative due to increased demand, which
is physically impossible.
V. CONCLUSION
We have explored two ways of implementing online
pricing mechanics in a micro-grid, with a novel approach
of subjecting the system model to a Stackelberg game with
incentive strategies. Furthermore conditions for stability were
found, as well as the role of the grid’s time constant, DC
gain, inertial, damping and synchronizing coefficients in the
transient and steady-state behavior of both configurations has
been studied. More importantly, we brought closer the market
and physical layers in the system by learning the way in
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Fig. 7. Time plot of (top) price, (middle) power flow, and (bottom)
frequency; by selecting large gain values, the demand exceeds the power
available in the grid.
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Fig. 8. Time plot of (top) power flow, and (bottom) frequency; oscillations
may arise in the frequency and power flow plot.
which the parameters that are chosen by the supplier, being a
price, a gain or incentive, affect the system response. Further
direction of this work involves the introduction of mean-
field models for the demand and the impact on the overall
dynamics of the interconnection of multiple grids.
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